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Introduction
In what follows I argue for three things. 
One, that the abstract concepts of ancient 
Greek and modern mathematics are funda-
mentally different. two, that this difference 
makes a difference in our understanding of 
a discipline other than mathematics, spe-
cifically, in the discipline of history. And, 
three, that what is at issue in this difference 
is whether it is necessary for human beings 
to understand themselves from the per-
spective of history in order to understand 
themselves properly as human. 
In order to argue that the concepts of 
ancient Greek and modern mathematics 
are fundamentally different, I first ana-
lyze aristotle’s account of the method of 
abstraction (ἀϕαιρεσις) within the context 
of his critique of the Platonic “separation” 
(χωρισμός) thesis. I then contrast aristo-
tle’s method with Descartes’ account of the 
abstraction that brings about the symbolic 
objects of analytic geometry and therewith 
the concepts that, to this day, characterize 
the concepts of mathematics. I will follow 
the path-breaking research of the philoso-
pher and historian of mathematics Jacob 
Klein by characterizing the Cartesian 
method of abstraction as “symbolic ab-
straction” and show that, in radical contrast 
with the aristotelian abstraction, its func-
tion is not to “lift off” sensible qualities 
from natural beings in order to arrive at the 
“pure” beings investigated by mathemati-
cians. rather, I will show that abstraction 
for Descartes functions to provide the pure 
intellect with visible representations of the 
“pure” mathematical concepts that it (the 
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intellect) has generated with its own power. 
Moreover, I will show that a decisive mark 
of the purity of the latter is the impossibil-
ity of their determinate representation in 
terms of the concepts that render intelligi-
ble the natural beings that are the concern 
of aristotle and pre-modern mathematics 
and philosophically generally. 
On the basis of establishing the differ-
ence between abstraction in ancient and 
modern mathematics, I will argue that 
there is a radical difference between the 
general concepts that were employed by 
ancient mathematicians and the ones now 
employed by modern mathematicians. the 
general treatment of mathematical things 
in ancient Greek mathematics manifestly 
does not presuppose a general (indeter-
minate) mathematical object, while in 
modern mathematics the generality of 
the method presupposes precisely such a 
general mathematical object. rather than 
explore any further the philosophical sig-
nificance of the incommensurability of 
ancient Greek and modern mathematical 
concepts, however, I will instead turn to 
my second argument. there I argue that 
the idea of “universal history” supposed 
by modern historiography and believed in 
by many contemporary humans owes its 
origin to something that is paradoxical. I 
will identify this paradox with the attempt 
at the beginning of the seventeenth
 
century 
to establish a “new science” that, in direct 
opposition to Descartes’ idea of “universal 
mathematics”, investigates and arrives at 
the “true certainty” of non-abstract, which 
is to say with its originator, particular and 
therefore “concrete” facts. My third argu-
ment will conclude by raising – but not an-
swering – the question of whether a proper 
self-understanding of what it means to be 
human must employ the perspective of 
universal history introduced by this new 
science.
I. the first Argument 
aristotle’s account of the origin of math-
ematical numbers (ἀριθμοί μαθηματικοί) 
represents a fundamental critique of the 
Platonic account and is therefore only com-
prehensible within its context. this can be 
seen from the fact that aristotle’s account 
explicitly takes issue with the Platonic sep-
aration thesis, its attribution of a generic 
unity to numbers (ἀριθμοί), and its sup-
position of a non-mathematical one (ἕν) in 
order to ground arithmetically mathemati-
cal unity. What is in dispute between Plato 
and aristotle, however, is not the being of 
numbers, characterized as the discrete de-
limitations of the field of noetic units into 
definite amounts, the first principle (ἀρχή) 
of which is one, but, rather, the mode of be-
ing proper to numbers when defined in this 
manner. the Platonic determination of the 
mode of being of “pure” numbers in order 
to account for the possibility of counting 
sensible beings misses, according to ar-
istotle, precisely the ontological depend-
ence that is characteristic of each number. 
From the fact that it is possible to articu-
late the parts of something in declarative 
speech (τῷ λόγῳ) before denominating the 
whole, it does not follow that the “being” 
(τῇ ουσίᾳ) of these parts has priority over 
the being of the whole. likewise, it does 
not follow from the assertion that there is 
any number of something that this number 
exists outside of that which it delimits with 
respect to its definite amount. For exam-
ple, in calling a human being “white”, no 
other being is meant than precisely this 
white human being. likewise, in the asser-
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tion “three trees”, “three” has the same sta-
tus as the “white”; the definite amount of 
trees, namely, “three”,”, therefore has no 
proper nature (ϕύσις). The being so many 
of trees, like their being green, is depend-
ent on there being trees. 
For aristotle, then, the ontological 
status of number is determined by their 
natural meaning: the assertion that certain 
things are present in a specific number 
means only that such a thing is present in 
just this definite multitude. This charac-
terization of the mode of being number, 
however, presents the problem of how to 
account for the purely noetical quality of 
mathematical numbers. this is a problem 
for aristotle because, unlike Plato, who 
posits an ontological independence of the 
intelligible being (νοητόν) from sensible 
beings, aristotle’s reliance on the natural 
meaning (revealed in the analysis of ordi-
nary speech) of numbers precludes making 
the supposition behind the Platonic posi-
tion. It precludes the hypothesis (ὑπόθεσις) 
that the homogeneous, indivisible (and 
therefore unchanging) characteristics 
proper to the first principle of numbers in 
mathematical knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) have 
their basis in a mode of being separate 
from sensible beings (αἰσθητά). Aristotle, 
instead, articulates the being belonging 
to these characteristics as one originat-
ing “by abstraction” (ἐξ ἀϕαιρέσεως), of 
being “lifted off”,”, “drawn off”,”, or, in 
other words, being “abstracted” from sen-
sible beings. the mathematical objects 
(τὰ μαθηματικὰ) studied by mathematical 
knowledge, which in their being are not 
detached from sensible beings, are there-
fore nevertheless studied as if they were 
detached or separated. 
How is it that someone who thinks 
mathematical objects is able to do so as 
separate from sensible beings, even though 
they are not separate? the answer to this 
question arises by considering how the 
“single parts” (μέρη) of sensible beings 
are gotten hold of in the talk about them 
(λόγος). When the aspects of a sensible 
thing are distinguished in speech one af-
ter the other from the concrete context 
of their being, a context without which 
they would not exist, for example, “this” 
“round” “white” “column”,”, it is appar-
ent that the nexus of being that links all the 
parts together is disregarded in a manner 
that allows each part to be singled out and 
apprehended separately. This “disregard-
ing of” establishes a new mode of seeing 
that allows something in sensible beings to 
come before its regard in a manner that, 
for all their variety and transitoriness, is 
unchanging. as such, it remains always in 
the same condition and therefore satisfies 
the demand that for aristotle as for Plato 
must be satisfied for a being to be an object 
of knowledge. Thus Aristotle writes: “Each 
thing may be viewed best in this way – if one 
posits that which is not separate as separate, 
just as the arithmetician and the geometer 
do” (Metaphysics M, 1078 a 21 ff.).
the lifting off characteristic of ab-
straction expresses nothing other than the 
“disregarding of” that makes possible the 
articulation in the talk (λόγος) of the single 
parts of a sensible thing, a disregarding in 
which sensible beings are deprived of their 
sensible qualities and individual differenc-
es. In a manner of speaking they whither 
away, becoming mere pieces of bodies or 
mere bodies themselves, such that a de-
monstrative discipline becomes possible, 
one that, as it were, “reads off” such pieces 
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or bodies their arithmetical and geometri-
cal aspects, namely, how many or how 
extensive they are. the theoretical math-
ematician, moreover, in making that which 
comes into view in abstraction as the sub-
ject matter of study, no longer views what 
has been abstractedly lifted off as having 
its basis in mere bodies. rather, disregard-
ing all that is sensible, the mathematician 
regards what has been abstracted in this 
manner merely as “pieces” (Stücke), piec-
es whose content, being indifferent to all 
that is sensible, leaves only that which is 
asked about in the question “how many” 
together with continuous magnitude. In 
the case of what is investigated with re-
spect to its number, these abstract pieces 
are transformed into neutral monads, into 
merely countable pieces of things whose 
sensible qualities have withered away. 
thus it is not an original separation but 
a subsequent indifference that character-
izes the mode of being of pure numbers. 
the task of determining how this mode of 
being itself is to be understood, however, 
belongs not to mathematics but to first phi-
losophy (πρώτη ϕιλοσοϕία) alone. This is 
the case, because mathematics simply has 
to accept the mode of being of the various 
original abstract beings that comprise the 
pregiven (vorgegeben) contents of arithme-
tic and geometry, for example, the “one”, 
the “line”, the “plane”, and so on, and deal 
with them only insofar their noncontradic-
tory connections are demonstrable.
It follows for aristotle from the abstract 
mode of being of the monad that the Pla-
tonic solution to the problem of the unity 
of the items in a number-assemblage, that 
is, to the question how the “many” can be 
understood as “one” at all, is untenable. 
In the first place, it is untenable because 
the positing of a “common thing” (κοινόν) 
above and alongside the multitude of units 
supposedly unified by the integrity of its 
genus (γένος) attributes unity to something 
that, properly speaking, cannot be one at 
all. It cannot be one, because what is meant 
in speaking of a number is precisely some-
thing that is more than one thing. things 
are one by immediate contact, mingling, or 
the disposition of their parts, none of which 
are possible when it comes to the monads 
in the dyad, triad, and so on. rather, just as 
two men are not one thing over and above 
both of them, so, too, in the case of two pure 
monads. In the second place, on account of 
what numbers are one, “no one says any-
thing” (Metaphysics L, 1075 b 34).
the Platonic view of the generic unity 
of numbers is the consequence of the sup-
position of the detachment and therefore 
independence of noetic monads from sen-
sible beings. this supposition removes the 
basis for appealing to the natural articula-
tion of ever different and divisible sensi-
ble beings to account for the origin of the 
delimitation and unification of single num-
bers. Having eliminated this ultimate foun-
dation of all possible unity, the separation 
thesis seduces the one who posits it into em-
bracing the view that the possibility of col-
lecting together two monads in one number 
has to be the effect of an original and there-
fore independent genus (γένος) or eidos 
(εἶδος). Monads, however, being in truth 
nothing other than sensible beings that have 
been do”). reduced by abstraction to mere 
countable pieces of such beings, are, like 
sensible beings (ἀισθητά), divisible. this 
means that when “one” monad is divided 
into “two” there is nothing but their be­
ing two that may be termed their “twoness”. 
That is, there is no “one thing” – the whole 
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of which is beyond or beside the monads 
in question – that provides the integrity of 
their delimitation as two. thus, for aristo-
tle, a number is precisely not one thing but 
a “heap” (σωρός) of sensible beings or ab-
stract monads. a number, therefore, is pre-
cisely nothing more than these parts, for it 
is only what has been or can be counted. 
this last point is crucial to aristotle 
for understanding properly the soul’s pre-
knowledge of all possible numbers, which 
he, following Plato, calls a “stored pos-
session” (κτῆσις) – in contrast to a “pos-
session in use” (ἕξις). Because a number 
is something that coincides with what is 
counted, the “pure” (that is, “indifferent” 
to the determinate qualities of sensible be-
ings) noetic structures available to the soul 
prior to counting must not be spoken of as 
one thing that, in turn, points to a common 
thing (κοινόν) that should be understood 
as a whole above and outside of the mul-
titude of counted objects. to the contrary, 
because the availability of such structures 
originally becomes known in counting, it 
is likewise rooted in the exercise of count-
ing sensible multitudes and extracting from 
them, by abstraction (ἐξ ἀϕαιρέσεως), 
“pure” monads. As a consequence, num-
bers of “pure” monads involve, no less than 
numbers of sensible beings, “heaps” – in 
this case, “heaps” of “pure” monads. They 
are therefore “one” only in the sense that 
something can be said to extend “over the 
whole” (καθόλου), which rules out their 
being “one thing” any more than numbers 
of sensible beings.
Aristotle’s answer to the question that 
he maintains is unanswered in the generic 
Platonic account of number namely, what 
it is that is responsible for its proper uni-
ty, begins by posing it only for actually 
counted multitudes. Such multitudes, as 
multitudes of homogeneous ones, com-
prise a unity insofar as each multitude is 
measured by its own one. Counting pre-
supposes the homogeneity of that which is 
counted, which means that in counting one 
and the same thing is fixed upon, such that 
its definite amount is arrived at only after 
one and the same thing has been counted 
over. The “one”, then, does not have prior-
ity in counting as the superiority of a genus 
over a species, but rather in its character as 
the “measure” (μέτρον) by which the defi-
nite amount of a multitude is determined. 
The “being one” of sensible beings marks 
both the possibility of their being counted 
and the indivisibility of the “one” that, in-
sofar as it functions to supply the measure 
of what is counted, is “one sensible thing” 
and therefore undivided. For example, the 
“being one” of each apple in a number of 
apples is not divided and therefore does 
not have a division, even though each ap-
ple as a sensible being can be divided, as 
can any other sensible being. Indivisibility 
therefore belongs to what is counted only 
insofar as it is the origin of the measure 
of the count, because “whatever does not 
have a division, insofar as it does not have 
it, is in that respect called one” (Metaphys­
ics D 6, 1016 b 4-6). Any specific number 
is therefore “a multitude measured by the 
one” (Metaphysics I 6, 1057 a 3 f.). as 
such, its “being” (οὐσία) is the multitude 
of units as such, in the precise sense of 
the “how many” it indicates. thus being 
(οὐσία) is understood here to be derived, 
insofar as that what each number is, is 
not something that is separate or detached 
from the definite amount of homogeneous 
units it delimits. Thus, for example, “six” 
units are not “two times three” or “three 
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time two” units, but rather precisely “once 
six”. For Aristotle, then, there is no such 
thing as the six, with a noetic being that 
would be distinct from the many hexads 
that delimit this or that multitude of “once 
six” units.
The “totally indivisible” (παντῃ 
ἀδιαίρετον) and “completely exact” 
(ἀκριβέστατον) status that the arithmeti-
cian understands the unit (μονάς) to pos-
sess arises for aristotle on the basis of the 
elevation of a habitual procedure to the 
rank of knowledge. the habitual expres-
sion of the sensible beings in every count 
in terms of their “being one” – for exam-
ple, instead saying “one apple, two apples, 
three apples”, what is said is rather “one, 
two, three” – points already to the purely 
arithmetical status of sensible beings as 
countable material. When this status is 
abstractedly “lifted off” sensible beings, 
the mathematical μονάς originates. And it 
originates as nothing more than the char-
acter of being a measure as such, a char-
acter expressed through its indivisibility 
and exactness. the character of the one 
as measure is what is responsible for the 
universal applicability of “pure” numbers, 
namely, of the applicability of the unit 
(μονάς) to any arbitrarily countable being 
whatsoever. The unit (μονάς) is so appli-
cable because its mode of being is not one 
of being separate from the sensible beings 
that are the source of its abstracted origin. 
Hence, it is only because sensible beings, 
as the kind of beings that they are, are one 
and indivisible, that the arithmetician – 
having already abstractedly posited the 
unit (μονάς) as totally indivisible – is able 
to then see what always follows from any 
given sensible being insofar as it is sub-
ject to being counted or calculated with as a 
“unit”. Thus, for example, a human being as 
the kind of being it is, namely as human be­
ing, is one and indivisible and, as such, the 
abstract unity (μονάς) is applicable to it.
In Descartes’ philosophy, however, the 
unit has a different status, that of a “sim-
ple thing” (res simplex), which is intuited 
by the “naked” or “pure” intellect when it 
beholds one of the ideas that it has separat-
ed from existent things, an idea to which 
nothing truly in existence corresponds. 
The “unit” (unitas) as a “simple intellec-
tual thing” (res simplex intellectualis) is 
therefore “not a quantity” (non est quanti­
tas). However, because, as a simple thing, 
it has the distinction of “belonging” to both 
the spiritual and the bodily realms, it is a 
“simple common thing” (res simplex com­
munis). The question of how the unit, as a 
simple intellectual thing and, therefore, as 
an indeterminate concept to which nothing 
determinate corresponds, is nevertheless 
able to “belong” to the bodily realm touch-
es upon the insoluble problem of Cartesian 
philosophy, namely, how the relation be-
tween body and soul is to be conceived. 
Because Descartes encounters this prob-
lem originally in the mathematical realm, 
in the problem of reconciling the indeter-
minacy of the algebraic quantities with the 
traditional determinateness of number, the 
difficulty it presents to Descartes is not 
crucial. Indeed, Descartes’ account of the 
pure intellect’s use of the “power” of the 
imagination in the service of reconciling 
the mathematical problem of the relation-
ship between determinate and indetermi-
nate quantity, remains the first and to this 
day the only philosophical attempt to fix 
the exact meaning of the abstraction that 
yields the new, algebraic number concepts 
that are employed by modern “univer-
65
sal mathematics” (mathesis universalis), 
which is to say, by the new “symbolic” 
mathematics. 
Descartes’ account of the role of the 
imagination in addressing this problem fo-
cuses upon the “pure” intellect’s use of the 
imagination’s power to make visible what 
otherwise would remain unvisualizable to 
it (the intellect), the indeterminate “simple 
intellectual things” that it has separated 
from determinate things. the separation 
of these “pure” things occurs when the 
intellect refers only to itself and its own 
conceiving, which is “pure” in the precise 
sense that its “cognitive power acts alone” 
(vis cognoscens sola agit) in a manner that 
is entirely “divorced from the aid of any 
bodily image” (absque ullius imaginis cor­
poreae adjumento) (Descartes 1701/1907: 
37). Referring solely to itself, the “pure” 
intellect is not only “bare” of any immedi-
ate reference to the world, but it is also un-
able to get a hold of what it has abstracted 
by using the images the imagination offers 
it, because any connection between the de-
terminacy of these images and indetermi-
nacy of the “pure intellectual things” leads 
necessarily to contradictions. In the imagi-
nation, the “idea” of extension cannot be 
separated from the “idea” of body, or the 
“idea” of number from the “idea” of the 
thing enumerated, or the “idea” of unity 
from the “idea” of quantity.
In order to visualize and therefore be 
able to grasp as “abstract beings” (entia 
abstracta) the “simple intellectual things” 
it has abstracted from these very same de-
terminate “ideas”, the pure intellect must 
make use of the alien imaginative power – 
but not its determinate images – to repre-
sent to itself the indeterminate and there-
fore unvisualizable content of what it has 
separated. the pure intellect is able to do 
this, because even within the realm of the 
“alien” imaginative power, it retains the 
ability proper to it and foreign to this pow-
er, namely, of separating indeterminate 
“simple intellectual things” from deter-
minate images. thus, for example, when 
the “pure” intellect separates “fiveness” 
from five enumerated things and appre-
hends it as a “mere multitude” (sola multi­
tudo) – and therefore as something that is 
separated from that which it “in truth” be-
longs to without being identical with (viz., 
the enumerated things) – the imaginative 
power, which ordinarily makes visible five 
units (perhaps as points), now makes vis-
ible something graphic, for instance (in 
the case at hand), the mark (nota) of the 
numeral that composes the pure concept 
of fiveness. The “pure” intellect, notwith-
standing its involvement with the visible 
numeral, retains its capacity to separate 
indeterminate “ideas” from determinate 
ones, which means that it keeps distinct 
the determinacy of the numeral from the 
indeterminacy of its “idea” of “mere mul-
titude”. This enables the visible numeral to 
“represent” to the “pure” intellect the in-
visibility of some one of its “simple intel-
lectual things”, in the precise sense that the 
“pure” intellect is able to get a hold of the 
thing separated through the numeral’s vis-
ibility, which it nevertheless keeps distinct 
from the “abstract being” of the “simple 
intellectual thing”. Because what the nu-
merals for general numbers or algebraic 
letter-signs for numbers in general repre-
sent are not the determinate things (units 
in the case at hand) from which the inde-
terminate “idea” (“fiveness” or “mere mul-
titude” respectively in the cases at hand) 
has been separated, but this very “idea” 
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itself, Klein characterizes its representa-
tive function as “symbolic”. It is precisely 
the “service” that the imagination’s power 
provides to the “pure” intellect by making 
the determinate numerals, algebraic marks, 
and geometric figures visible to it as a sym-
bolic representation of their indeterminate 
conceptual contents separated by the intel-
lect, that Klein calls “symbolic abstrac-
tion”, in recognition of (1) its distinction 
from aristotelian abstraction (ἀϕαίρεσις) 
and (2) its role in generating the symbols 
of the mathesis universalis.
Descartes’ account of abstraction, how-
ever, does not reconcile the indeterminacy 
of the quantity treated by the mathesis uni­
versalis and the determinacy of the quan-
tity proper to both enumerated things and 
the real figure of extended bodies. Both 
kinds of quantity are characterized by him 
as that kind of thing “which accepts the 
more or less” (quod recipit majus et minus) 
and that can therefore be called magnitude. 
the fact that Descartes stresses the non-
identity of the indeterminacy of the “idea” 
of magnitude that is abstracted by the 
“pure” intellect and the determinacy of the 
“idea” of magnitude that is in the imagina-
tion raises the question of how he thinks 
“that nothing can be said of magnitudes in 
general which cannot also be ascribed to 
some specific form or other” (nihil dici de 
magnitudinibus in genere, quod non etiam 
ad quamlibet in specie possit referri) (Des-
cartes 1701/1907: 49). Descartes’ answer 
to this question appeals to both the “fig-
urality” of the real extension of the mag-
nitudes presented in the imagination and 
the fact that it is the same imagination that 
serves the “pure” intellect in its treatment 
of general magnitudes.
Descartes conceives of the “image-
making organ itself, with the ideas existing 
in it”, “as being nothing but a true body, 
really extended and having figure”. Its ex-
tension and figure are received – literally – 
by the “impressions” that it receives from 
the part of the world that makes them, and 
it is precisely this, that the same corporeal 
nature of the world belongs to the imagi-
nation and all its ideas, which allows the 
mathesis universalis to grasp the “true 
world”. The mathesis universalis can do 
this because the “figurality” of the magni-
tude that is depicted in the imagination is 
the real extension of a body that has been 
abstracted from everything except that it 
has figure, and it is precisely to this “fig-
urality” that the mathesis universalis trans-
fers what the “intellect allows us to say 
about magnitudes in general” (Klein 1968: 
209). the conclusion that Klein draws 
from Descartes’ philosophical reconcilia-
tion of the indeterminacy of general quan-
tity (magnitude) with that of the determi-
nacy of specific quantity (magnitude), is 
that extension has a twofold character in 
Descartes’ thought: as the object of “gen-
eral algebra”, it is “symbolic”; as the sub-
stance of the corporeal world, it is real. 
II. the Second Argument 
the failure to reconcile the indeterminacy 
of the quantity treated by the mathesis uni­
versalis and the determinacy of the quan-
tity proper to both enumerated things and 
the real figure of extended bodies is not 
Descartes’ alone; it is shared by all who 
attempt to account for the unity of the for-
malized concepts employed by the sym-
bolic calculus that makes modern logic 
and mathematics possible, together with 
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the formalized concepts at work in modern 
knowledge in general, on the basis of their 
putative abstraction from the natural beings 
accessible only to sense perception. and it 
is thus shared by all who – wittingly or un-
wittingly – continue to heed Giambattista 
Vico’s call early in the eighteenth century 
for a “New Science” of the particular, the 
individual, the concrete in contrast with 
the abstract truths of the philosophers.
this new science, of course, is histo-
ry, and, in the words of its originator, its 
pursuit of the non-abstract leads to what is 
“certain” (Certum) in direct opposition to 
the “common” (commune) and therefore 
abstract truths of the philosophers. Vico 
asserts that “Certum and commune are op-
posed to each other”, and he concludes that 
by pursuing what is common, philosophy 
lacks certainty. Only history (including 
philology) deals with the certain, and most 
certain for humans is what they have made, 
facta, facts. It is in this vein that he writes
the world of civil society has certainly been 
made by men, and that its principles are the-
refore to be found within the modifications 
of our own human mind. Whoever reflects on 
this cannot but marvel that the philosophers 
should have bent all their energies to the 
study of the world of nature, which, since 
God made it, He alone knows; and that they 
should have neglected the study of the world 
of nations or civil society, which, since man 
had made it, men could hope to know. (Vico 
1744/1948: 96)
the non-abstract facts studied by Vi-
co’s science involve the “natural customs 
of men”, which include in its scope a “his-
tory of human ideas” – which is not to be 
confused with a philosophical reflection 
on ideas. The proper field of the historian, 
who is the practitioner of Vico’s New Sci-
ence, is the customs, institutions, laws, and 
writings of humans, and, in understand-
ing them, the historian’s understanding 
and therefore “history” itself is supposed 
to yield precisely what philosophy lacks: 
truth that is certain and thus “truthful cer-
tainty”. 
this truthful certainty is the product 
of the historian’s discovery of the laws 
governing the human world in contradis-
tinction to the laws governing the natural 
world. this means for Vico that not only 
does the historian become the sole true 
philosopher, but, also, that the historian’s 
work is in competition with the work of 




century was called “natural philosophy” – 
that is, the work of Descartes’ and others’ 
“mathematical physics” made possible by 
the new universal mathematics. 
III. the third Argument 
Now a contemporary “historian of ideas” 
might justifiably object to the presentation 
so far of the “history” of Vico’s New Scien-
ce and therefore the origin of the modern 
discipline of history, by pointing out that 
Vico’s formulation of the New Science 
is founded on an idea that is rejected by 
contemporary historians, namely, that of 
the “ideal eternal history” of nations estab-
lished by divine providence. In contrast to 
Vico, the object of historical research and 
therefore the content of the truthful cer-
tainty of history is no longer understood by 
historians to be laws about “universal and 
eternal orders established by providence”. 
Fair enough. However, the next claim I 
am about to make is one that no historian 
can justifiably object to, because it is not a 
claim about the truthful certainties estab-
lished by the discipline of history but about 
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the origin of history as a discipline with a 
subject matter that is supposedly universal. 
It is a claim about what contemporary phi-
losophers call the “problem” of history, a 
problem, therefore, which, properly speak-
ing, is not a historical problem. this prob-
lem is not historical because what is called 
into question by it is precisely the justifica-
tion of both the historian’s claim to have 
cognition of something called history and 
also the universality of “history itself” that 
is the supposed “object” of this cognition.
My claim is this: Vico’s “ideal eternal 
history” is derived from Descartes’ idea 
of a universal mathematics, a mathesis 
universalis. as we have seen, universal 
mathematics on Descartes’ understand-
ing involves the intellect’s cognition of its 
own powers of cognition, in a manner that 
yields concepts whose unity and therefore 
universality is indeterminate. this means 
that these concepts are neither particular 
nor individual and that they are therefore 
decidedly not concrete. Vico’s “ideal eter-
nal history” is likewise the object of the 
investigation of principles that are found 
only within “the modifications of our hu-
man mind”, and as universal mathematics 
is to all specific mathematical disciplines, 
so, too, is the “ideal eternal history” to all 
the specific histories of nations. The “his-
torical fact” about the general abandon-
ment of Vico’s “ideal of eternal history” by 
historians and their discipline, and, indeed, 
the appeal to any so-called historical fact, 
cannot address the next point I am about 
to make, namely: that the indeterminate 
idea of “historical universality” takes the 
place of Vico’s “ideal of eternal history” 
in the science of history. this idea is in-
determinate because, like Descartes’ idea 
of the unity of the concepts of universal 
mathematics, it is not arrived at according 
to the principle of abstraction from the in-
dividual beings in the natural world around 
us but rather according to the principle 
“verum ipsum factum” (“the true is the 
made”), as in what is made by the human 
understanding. and, while it might seem 
that nothing could be more concrete than 
the human understanding – when measured 
by its immediate experience of this world 
around us – it is nevertheless precisely the 
“universality” that is supposed to charac-
terize the subject matter of historical cog-
nition that rules out the historian’s claim to 
establish the truthful certainty on the basis 
of the non-abstract – and therefore, non-
universal – being of the “history” of the 
customs, institutions, laws, and writings of 
humans.
the universality of history, in a word, 
is a product of the science of history, of the 
supposition that to this science’s method 
of investigating the universal principles at 
work in the facts made by humans there 
corresponds a likewise universal object, 
namely, history “itself”. As the “object” of 
the science of history, history is paradoxi-
cally understood to be neither a principle 
nor a fact, but, rather, it (history) is under-
stood to be that about which the principles 
of historiography discover and articulate 
as the non-abstract, “truthful certainties” 
that compose the “facts” of history as a 
discipline. The question whether this sup-
position is warranted, whether it is in some 
sense necessary for humans to understand 
everything in the world, including them-
selves, from the perspective of universal 
history, is a question I suggest we take up 
in further discussions. By way of a conclu-
sion, I would like to call attention to three 
consequences of the belief that the his-
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torical perspective is indeed a belief that 
is necessary for our self-understanding as 
humans.
One: a fascination with the “otherness” 
of the past, which leads to the “discovery” 
of civilizations different from “our” West-
ern civilization, each with different “val-
ues”; from the “certain facts” unearthed 
by the discovery of the past, humanity be-
comes fragmented into autonomously dif-
ferent “cultures”, the existence of which 
becomes a fact as certain as that of truth 
itself being the function of the relativity of 
values proper to “different” cultures; 
Two: the sense that the events in our 
life and the ideas we have about these 
events are an essential part of history’s re-
lentless motion from the past to the future, 
which is discernable as a movement that is 
manifest in the “trends” in which we are at 
once caught up in and, insofar as they can 
be observed, that we are supposed to orient 
our actions to as well as our ideas by. 
And three: our self-understanding as 
completely historical beings, in the sense 
that “historicity” becomes our very “na-
ture”, such that our “self” is defined by its 
social, which is to say, historical, construc-
tion and our attempts to come to terms with 
this certain fact. Historicity in this sense 
does not mean tradition but rather our 
severance from tradition; with this sever-
ance, tradition assumes the guise of either 
a romantic notion or an academic ghost, as 
our invisible ties to the past give way to 
historical facts and the belief in their non-
abstract truth, which is to say, give rise to 
what nowadays is called “historicism” by 
both those who judge this belief to be nec-
essary to our proper self-understanding as 
humans, as well as by those who do not 
share this belief. 
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Šiame straipsnyje ginamos trys tezės. Pirma, kad 
abstrakčios antikos ir naujųjų laikų matematikos 
sąvokos yra fundamentaliai skirtingos. Bendras ma-
tematinių dalykų traktavimas antikos matematikoje 
akivaizdžiai nesuponuoja tokios matematinio objekto 
sąvokos, kokią numato naujųjų laikų matematikos 
metodas. Antra, šis abstrakčių matematikos sąvokų 
vienuMas antiKos ir nauJųJų LaiKų FiLosoFiJoJe ir visuotinės istoriJos 
Hipotezė
burt C. Hopkins
S u m m a r y
skirtingumas turi įtakos kitos, nematematinės dis-
ciplinos, o būtent – istorijos, supratimui. Trečia, šio 
skirtumo esminis aspektas yra klausimas, ar savęs kaip 
žmogaus suvokimui būtina suprasti save iš istorijos 
perspektyvos.
pagrindiniai žodžiai: matematiniai objektai, 
skaičiaus sąvoka, istorija, savimonė.
